Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 4

Issue 2

2022

United States: New York Clearing House Association, The Panic of
1890
Benjamin Hoffner
Yale School of Management

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons,
Macroeconomics Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Policy History, Theory,
and Methods Commons, and the Public Administration Commons

Recommended Citation
Hoffner, Benjamin (2022) "United States: New York Clearing House Association, The Panic of 1890,"
Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 4 : Iss. 2, 1300-1321.
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol4/iss2/60

This Case Study is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Financial Crises and
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact
journalfinancialcrises@yale.edu.

United States:
New York Clearing House Association,
The Panic of 18901
Benjamin Hoffner2
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
July 15, 2022
Abstract
Before the advent of the Federal Reserve System, private clearinghouses provided
emergency liquidity support to the banking system during panics. The most notable of these
institutions, the New York Clearing House Association (NYCH), supported its member banks
by issuing clearinghouse loan certificates (CLCs), short-term collateralized loans guaranteed
by the NYCH, as an alternative liquidity source during banking panics; member banks used
CLCs exclusively for the purpose of temporarily settling payments with other NYCH
members. During the Panic of 1890, the NYCH issued $16.65 million of CLCs between
November 12 and December 22, 1890. The Loan Committee received requests from and
authorized CLC issuance to member banks with corresponding collateral pledges, which
were subject to a minimum 25% haircut. The NYCH required borrowing banks to pay out 6%
interest to accepting banks—other members that received the CLCs in place of cash
settlements—as well as a 0.25% monthly commission fee. A borrowing bank could redeem
the CLC and then petition the Loan Committee to retire the loan, ending interest payments
and receiving back its collateral. The CLCs, which peaked at $15.21 million outstanding on
December 12, 1890, were all redeemed by February 7, 1891. With the help of substantial
liquidity from the Treasury and the bailout of troubled banks by two banking syndicates, the
NYCH liquidity support via CLCs contained the panic, and ultimately, only a small number of
banks failed. Unlike several other crises in the National Banking Era (1863–1913), New York
banks did not temporarily suspend payments to depositors.
Keywords: clearinghouse loan certificates, National Banking Era, New York Clearing House
Association, Panic of 1890, private lender of last resort

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based emergency lending programs. Cases are available from the Journal of
Financial Crises at
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
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Overview
Chartered in 1854, New York Clearing House
Association (NYCH) was a private institution
created to facilitate the settlement process
for interbank transactions for banks around
New York City. Most of the largest banks in
New York joined as members of the NYCH,
keeping their reserves at the NYCH, which
streamlined the procedure for settling
balances with other banks (Fulmer 2022).
During the National Banking Era (1863–
1913), a period marked by the absence of a
central bank, the NYCH served as a private
lender of last resort for its member banks
during banking crises (Cannon 1910a;
Fulmer 2022).
In 1890, banking disruptions—beginning in
the first half of year—culminated in two
separate episodes of credit tightening: one
between August and September and the
other in November (Wicker 2000, 44–45).
The latter incident came to be known as the
Panic of 1890 and is the subject of this case
study. Although collapsing stock market
prices extended from May to November,
losing on average half of their value, the
disturbances did not translate into bank
failures until the end of 1890 (NYT 1890a).

Key Terms
Purpose: “For the purpose of enabling banks that
were short of cash to make their exchanges” (NYT
1890a)
Launch Dates

Announcement:
November 11, 1890
First issuance:
November 12, 1890

Expiration Dates

Final issuance:
December 22, 1890
Final cancellation:
February 7, 1891

Legal Authority

Not applicable

Peak Outstanding

$15.21 million on
December 12, 1890

Participants

24 of 66 eligible NYCH
member banks

Rate

6% fixed + 0.25% per
month left unretired

Collateral

Bills receivable, stocks,
bonds, and other
securities

Loan Duration

Not applicable

During August and September 1890, the
NYCH disclosed
seasonal flow of funds out of New York City to Notable Features
identities of banks
finance
crop
transportation
placed
borrowing CLCs
downward pressure on the reserves of NYCH
member banks (Wicker 2000, 14, 144). Outcomes
Smallest of the NYCH
crises, with only one
Meanwhile, financial spillovers from foreign
member bank failure
markets during the summer of 1890 eroded
valuations of US securities (Wicker 2000, 42).
To relieve the credit tightness, from July 19 the November 1, the Treasury spent $99
million—the bulk of its surplus—on bond redemptions to alleviate money market
disruptions (OCC 1891). However, when the second episode of credit tightness materialized
in November, the Treasury did not have an available surplus to support the distressed
banking system. Subsequently, the NYCH took on the role of providing liquidity relief in the
form of clearinghouse loan certificates (CLCs) (Wicker 2000, 45).
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Throughout 1890, the British banking system was adversely affected by spillovers from a
financial crisis in Argentina (CFC 1891). On November 7, the Bank of England unexpectedly
raised its discount rate from 5% to 6%, which generated “a general feeling of apprehension
and alarm” in both London and US markets (Gorton and Tallman 2016; Sprague 1910, 141).3
On Saturday, November 8, New York banks’ reserves revealed a $4.24 million decline, falling
below the legal limit (reserve deficit) (Sprague 1910, 141).
On November 11, as money markets continued to tighten further, the panic in New York
came to a head with the announcement that the brokerage firm Decker, Howell & Co. ran out
of cash; the brokerage firm owed $1.40 million in overdraft to the Bank of North America, a
member of the NYCH (NYT 1890a; Sprague 1910, 142). While still solvent, the Bank of North
America became short $900,000 cash to settle balances with other member banks of the
NYCH. Before the NYCH stepped in to support banks, J.P. Morgan assembled nine NYCH bank
presidents, himself included, who agreed to loan the Bank of North America the sum of its
clearinghouse deficit (NYT 1890a). Later that day, November 11, the NYCH complemented
the individual members’ efforts to resolve the crisis by authorizing an emergency plan
effective November 12. This plan established a temporary Loan Committee authorized to
issue clearinghouse loan certificates to members as a form of liquidity relief. A CLC was an
instrument used for the sole purpose of replacing legal currency in the settlement of balances
between NYCH member banks (OCC 1891).
Under the CLC resolution of 1890, NYCH member banks could request certificates in
increments of $20,000 and presented bills receivable and other securities, including stocks
and bonds, as collateral, subject to a minimum haircut of 25% (OCC 1891). After the Loan
Committee approved a borrowing member bank’s request, the borrowing bank then
presented their CLCs as temporary substitutes for currency to settle clearinghouse balances
with another member (the accepting bank) of the NYCH. As compensation, the CLC contract
required the borrower to pay a 6% annual interest plus 0.25% monthly commission to the
accepting bank until the certificate’s cancellation (Cannon 1910a). The accepting bank could
also thereafter use the CLC for a later settlement with another member bank, and in so doing,
the accrual of interest transferred to the new accepting bank (Hoag 2016).
Importantly, all members were obligated to accept CLCs as temporary settlement payments
from borrowing banks or risk their NYCH membership (Cannon 1910a; Gorton and Tallman
2018, 43). However, the NYCH collectively guaranteed the equitable distribution of losses
related to defaulted CLCs so that accepting banks did not individually bear the credit risk of
a borrower’s CLC. Moreover, if a borrower defaulted on its CLC, the Loan Committee
liquidated the collateral and the total remaining loss was mutually repaid across the
membership in proportion to the share of capital plus surplus reserves of each member
(Gorton and Tallman 2016; Hoag 2016).

On November 6, 1890—though not publicly disclosed at the time—the Bank of England was notified of the
distress of Baring Brothers & Co., a large British investment bank with significant exposures to the Argentinean
financial crisis (Banerjee 2017, 4; CFC 1891). The formal announcement on November 15 of Baring’s distress
generated a second shock to New York banks (CFC 1891; Wicker 2000, 46).
3
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From November 12 through December 22, 1890, the Loan Committee issued a total of $16.65
million in certificates (Gorton and Tallman 2016). CLCs outstanding reached a peak of $15.21
million on December 12, 1890, and the last remaining certificates were finally retired on
February 7, 1891 (Cannon 1910a). Of the 66 eligible NYCH member banks,4 24 banks took
out CLCs in 1890; compared to other panics, in 1890, only a few large national banks—two
of the largest six—borrowed CLCs (Moen and Tallman 2013). See Figure 1 for the relative
volume of CLCs issued during the Panic of 1890 compared to other National Banking Era
panics.
Figure 1: Relative Size of the CLCs Issued by the NYCH across Panics, 1873–1907

Source: Moen and Tallman 2013.

One unique feature of the 1890 CLC issuance was the NYCH’s decision to deploy CLCs early
in the crisis when only a few of its members had experienced bank runs (Gorton and Tallman
2018, 54). As such, the issuance of CLCs in 1890 was similar to that of 1884 insofar as the
measure provided aid to specific, vulnerable NYCH banks, rather than the membership as a
whole (Gorton and Tallman 2018, 51). The CLC program in 1890 also differed from other
panics in that the NYCH publicized borrowing banks’ identities (Gorton and Tallman 2016).

The OCC report of 1890 reported that, as of 1890, the NYCH membership, excluding the sub-treasury, was
comprised of 64 member banks, 20 of which were State-chartered banks and the remaining 44 were national
banks, incorporated under the National Banking Act (OCC 1890, 69). This is slightly different than the numbers
used by Moen and Tallman (2013), which we primarily rely on in this case.
4
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Summary Evaluation
Of the five panics during the National Banking Era, those in 1884 and 1890 are considered
less severe and more localized panics. The Panic of 1890 saw the fewest bank failures, 18, as
compared to the maximum of 503 observed in 1893 out of the set of five panics (Wicker
2000, 4). Of the 1890 bank failures, only one was an NYCH member bank, North River Bank
(Gorton and Tallman 2016).
Wicker (2000) distinguishes these two crises as “incipient” panics in which the banking
system avoided a “general loss of depositor confidence,” thanks to the NYCH, which “acted
with dispatch to forestall a banking panic” through CLC relief (Wicker 2000, xv). Wicker
notes that the Panic of 1890 shared many characteristics with more severe banking crises
and that without the rapid dispersal of CLCs, 1890 may have materialized into a “full-scale
banking panic” (Wicker 2000, 41). Similarly, Gorton and Tallman speculate that in these two
crises, “the issuance of loan certificates was, apparently, by itself enough to forestall runs”
(Gorton and Tallman 2016).
The Panic of 1890 was the only National Banking Era crisis in which the Treasury provided
significant relief to the banking system (Wicker 2000, 133). Wicker points out that it was the
“main reason why there were no bank closings in August and September,” which “prevented
the situation from deteriorating into a full-scale financial panic” (Wicker 2000, 44–45). Moen
and Tallman (2013) give it more weight, attributing the overall successful resolution of the
Panic of 1890 to the Treasury’s actions. They note that the supply of funds used to purchase
bonds “dwarf[ed] the issues of clearing house loan certificates.” However, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in the 1891 annual report, emphasized the insufficiency
of the Treasury relief alone in allaying the Panic of 1890:
It is apparent, however, that while the [Treasury] relief afforded was timely and the
sums disbursed very large, the unfavorable and threatening conditions were caused to
a greater degree by want of confidence and a curtailment of credits than by lack of
circulating medium. (OCC 1891)
In the context of the two episodes of credit tightness in 1890, the loan contraction by NYCH
banks amounted to $14 million for the August–September distress (addressed by Treasury
intervention) and $21 million during the November panic (addressed by the NYCH’s CLC
resolution) (Wicker 2000, 42, 43). Compared to the aggregate CLC issuance, the Treasury’s
bond redemptions of $99 million represented a much larger volume of direct liquidity
support (OCC 1891). Despite this smaller scale of liquidity operations, the CLC issuance in
November and December corresponded with larger and sustained recoveries in reserve
surpluses; Figure 2 shows the aggregate level of surplus reserves amongst the NYCH
members as well as the outstanding CLC volume during the months of banking disturbances
in 1890 (Gorton and Tallman 2016).
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Figure 2: NYCH Reserve Surplus vs. Outstanding CLCs, August 1890–January 1891

Source: Gorton and Tallman 2016.

1305

United States

Hoffner

Context: NYCH 1890-1891
Net deposits of NYCH membership
(average of weekly data)
Loans held by NYCH membership
(average of weekly data)
Capital and surplus of NYCH membership
(average of weekly data)
Required reserves held by NYCH membership
(average of weekly data)
Number of members in the NYCH
NYCH clearing transactions (annual)
Number of commercial failures
Total liabilities of commercial failures
Total individual deposits for the United States
(excluding savings banks)
Ratio of aggregate CLC issuance to net deposits
of NYCH membership
Source: Andrew 1910.
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$404.3 million in 1890
$409.4 million in 1891
$399.8 million in 1890
$400.9 million in 1891
$120.8 million in 1890
$124.2 million in 1891
$101.0 million in 1890
$102.3 million in 1891
65 in 1890
64 in 1891
$37.5 billion in 1890
$33.7 billion in 1891
10,907 failures in 1890
12,273 failures in 1891
$189.9 million in 1890
$189.9 million in 1891
$2,511 million in 1890
$2,542 million in 1891
4.1% in 1890
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The NYCH issued CLCs to provide relief to illiquid banks and to resolve
general tightness in money markets.
In 1890, as bank credit contracted, the average price for stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange declined by almost 50% between May and November. The panic in the stock
market culminated on November 11, 1890, with the failure of the prominent brokerage firm
Decker, Howell & Co., which ran out of cash and could not honor $1.40 million in obligations
to the Bank of North America, an NYCH member (NYT 1890a). The Bank of North America,
short $900,000 in cash required to settle clearinghouse balances, could not safely liquidate
its available assets under the adverse market conditions and, consequently, faced “imminent
collapse” (Wicker 2000, 45).
The NYCH membership held an emergency meeting that same day, November 11, and
unanimously approved a plan to extend liquidity support for the Bank of North America,
along with two other illiquid members, Mechanics & Traders’ National Bank and North River
Bank (Gorton and Tallman 2016). Through a temporary Loan Committee, the NYCH began
issuing clearinghouse loan certificates the following day in an initial allotment directed
toward the three banks to be used “in settlements of balances at the clearing house” (OCC
1891). The use of CLCs to settle intermember bank balances allowed borrowing members to
use all of the cash on their individual balance sheets for transactions outside the NYCH
membership (NYT 1890a).
2. Legal Authority: The NYCH’s status as a private institution did not provide a clear
legal basis for CLC issuance, yet regulators did not interfere with these liquidity
operations.
The banking legislation of the National Banking Era did not grant private bank
clearinghouses, like the NYCH, unique legal status. Rather, clearinghouses were voluntary
organizations of private banks (Wicker 2000, 128).
Bank notes issued by state-chartered banks or private banks at the time were subject to a
10% tax (Timberlake 1984). If treated as currency, CLCs neglected to pay out the 10% tax,
potentially undermining their legality (Cannon 1910a).
However, contemporary sources and scholars tend to agree that CLCs used entirely for
interbank transactions—such as those issued in 1873, 1884, and 1890—did not break this
law because they did not circulate as currency. The National Bank Act of 1864 sanctioned
CLCs that circulated only between banks: “Clearing-house certificates, representing specie
or lawful money specifically deposited for the purpose of any clearing-house association,
shall be deemed to be lawful money” (National Bank Act of 1864 1864, 13:109).
A former clearinghouse chairman, James Cannon, wrote in 1910 that the term “clearinghouse certificates” used in the act would refer both to the certificates that clearinghouses

1307

United States

Hoffner

issued in normal times, which were backed by gold, and to clearinghouse loan certificates
that they issued in crises, which were backed by securities (Cannon 1910b).
In 1895, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Philler et al. vs. Patterson, discussed the
legitimacy of the Philadelphia Clearing House Association and loan certificates issued by it
that were similar to the CLCs issued by the NYCH. The case seems to support the legality of
CLCs generally (Philler et al. v. Patterson 1895, 482).
According to the opinion by Justice Henry W. Williams in Philler et al. vs. Patterson:
We are unable therefore to see in what respect these banks have violated the statutes of
the United States relating to national banks or have transcended the limits which these
statutes have drawn about the business of banking. . . . This same method or one identical
in general outline has been adopted by the banks in every great city in the United States
and by many in other lands; and as far as I am aware, it has nowhere been held that the
method is illegal. (Philler et al. v. Patterson 1895, 482)
Starting in 1893, some clearinghouses issued CLCs in smaller denominations and
encouraged their use as currency, raising more directly the question of their legality under
the National Banking Act. Timberlake (1984) cites several authors who in later decades
argued that those small-denomination CLCs issued outside New York were clearly illegal
(Timberlake 1984, 8).
Whether or not CLCs violated note issuance laws, banking regulators offered tacit approval
of their use by not prosecuting or taxing such operations. Moreover, authorities recognized
the value of CLCs in restoring banking stability during a time in which clear legal alternatives
did not exist (Andrew 1908).
3. Part of a Package: The issuance of CLCs to member banks accompanied other
remedial measures administered by the NYCH, individual financiers, and the
Treasury.
In 1890, as in other banking crises in the National Banking Era, the NYCH suppressed weekly
balance sheet reports by individual member banks and conducted special examinations of
some banks’ portfolios. In other crises, NYCH members partially suspended the
convertibility of deposits into cash, issuing certified checks backed by the NYCH to
depositors in place of cash; however, this did not occur in the crises of 1884 or 1890 (Gorton
and Tallman 2016).
Special Examinations: After issuing the first round of CLCs on November 12, the NYCH
introduced special examinations of three member banks in response to the unexpected
closure of North River Bank, a borrowing member bank. Between November 13 and
November 15, the NYCH’s Clearing House Committee5 inspected the financial health of North
River Bank, Bank of North America, and Mechanics & Traders’ National Bank (Gorton and
5 The Clearing House Committee was the permanent executive committee of the NYCH holding “almost absolute

power, the direction of practically the whole machinery of the [clearinghouse]” (Cannon 1910b).
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Tallman 2016). In contrast to the examination of Metropolitan National Bank in 1884, the
NYCH began examining banks only after each had already received CLCs (NYT 1890a; OCC
1891). Without revealing the precise details of these examinations, the Clearing House
Committee published the overall results, which circulated in the New York Times each day
after an examination; only North River Bank received a negative assessment and remained
closed following the inspection (Gorton and Tallman 2016).
NYCH Member Loan Syndicates: On November 11, the day before the first issues of CLCs,
distressed member banks received special settlement loans from two separate loan
syndicates of financially sound members.
•

One such syndicate of nine NYCH members, led by J.P. Morgan, agreed to provide
loans to the Bank of North America hours before the NYCH meeting authorized CLCs
(Wicker 2000, 45). The nine banks agreed to each lend $100,000 on securities to the
illiquid bank to help settle its $900,000 balance at the clearinghouse (NYT 1890a).
These advances were quickly redeemed when, on the same day, the NYCH issued
the Bank of North American $900,000 in CLCs (NYT 1890b).

•

Prior to its closure on November 12, 1890, the North River Bank found itself short
of $60,000 needed to settle clearinghouse balances on November 11. Two banks,
Importers and Traders’ National Bank and Gallatin National Bank, each advanced
$30,000 against securities to allow North River Bank to make payments. The
following day, the Loan Committee approved the North River Bank’s request for
$95,000 in CLCs, which it used to promptly redeem the $60,000 in advances from
the two banks. However, the state examiners ruled the North River Bank insolvent
later that day and the bank closed indefinitely (NYT 1890b).

Treasury Intervention: During August and September 1890—months before the NYCH
assisted its distressed member banks—the US Treasury responded to initial banking
disturbances through significant bond redemptions. Made possible through the rare
coincidence of a government surplus during financial stress, these redemptions totaled $99
million in direct liquidity support (OCC 1891). While the actions of the Treasury helped
relieve the initial period of credit tightness in 1890, once these problems resurfaced in
November, the bond redemptions had exhausted most of the surplus, preventing further
Treasury support (Wicker 2000, 45). Wicker (2000, 44) remarks on the moral hazard
involved where some “money market participants expected US Treasury support . . . and the
Secretary [of Treasury] did not hesitate to acknowledge his responsibility.”
4. Management: The NYCH Loan Committee managed the distribution of CLCs and
valued and held collateral. If required, the Clearing House Committee conducted
examinations of CLC applicants.
Similar to CLC issuance in other crises, the NYCH established a temporary Loan Committee,
consisting of five members, including the chair of the clearinghouse (Gorton and Tallman
2018, 43). The NYCH authorized the Loan Committee to approve CLC requests on the basis
of collateral deemed “satisfactory” to the committee (OCC 1891).
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During its evaluation of a banks’ CLC application and collateral offering, the Loan Committee
sometimes alerted the Clearing House Committee, which could examine whether a bank had
requested an exorbitant sum (NYT 1890b). Although the NYCH promised to judge
applications impartially, Gorton and Tallman (2016) express uncertainty as to whether the
Loan Committee used an applicant’s financial condition as part of the CLC approval process.
Borrowing banks largely dictated the process of canceling a CLC by notifying the Loan
Committee, which then decided the date at which interest payments would end (Cannon
1910a; Hoag 2016). The Loan Committee determined when it would stop issuing CLCs; the
last issuance was on December 22, 1890 (Gorton and Tallman 2016; OCC 1891).
5. Administration: The Loan Committee issued CLCs against collateral by approving
requests from member banks; banks then used CLCs to settle balances within the
NYCH membership.
At the start of the crisis, the NYCH membership met to establish the temporary Loan
Committee, authorize CLC issuance, set minimum haircuts, and define eligible collateral (OCC
1891). In turn, banks sent requests to the Loan Committee for a certain sum and deposited
relevant collateral to be approved by the committee. In the case of 1890, the Loan Committee
issued CLCs in increments of $20,000 (OCC 1891).
Most of the discretion given to the Loan Committee pertained to the approval of CLC
collateral. So long as collateral satisfied the 25% minimum haircut, the Loan Committee
could determine the exact quantity and quality of securities sufficient for CLC approval (NYT
1890a).
After approving CLC applications, the Loan Committee issued certificates to the requesting
banks, which stipulated a fixed interest rate, paid by the borrower to an accepting member
bank, which received the CLCs as temporary cash substitutes for settling balances. The NYCH
emphasized the necessity for all member banks to accept CLCs from borrowing banks as a
condition for membership (Cannon 1910a).
Once borrowing banks could afford redeeming CLCs in cash, borrowers typically initiated
the cancellation process by informing the Loan Committee, which then announced a date on
which the corresponding interest payments would cease (Hoag 2016). In the final step, the
Loan Committee returned deposited collateral in the same proportion used to initially secure
the CLC (Cannon 1910a).
Along with the authorization of the Loan Committee, the NYCH also passed a resolution for
retirement of CLCs if the corresponding collateral appeared to be insufficient for redemption.
The resolution stated that losses resulting from CLCs would be distributed across the NYCH
membership in proportion to each member’s share of “capital and surplus” (OCC 1891).
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6. Eligible Participants: Only NYCH member banks were eligible to receive CLC
issues, and solvency tests did not appear to be a condition for loan approval.
The NYCH confined CLC operations within its membership, and therefore, only member
banks could request CLCs used for settling balances exclusively with other members of the
association (OCC 1891). Out of the 66 NYCH member banks in 1890, 24 took out CLCs (Moen
and Tallman 2013; OCC 1890). During the Panic of 1890, as compared to other panics,
relatively few large national banks—only two of the six largest—borrowed any CLCs. State
banks, which did not issue CLCs during 1884, were uniquely large issuers of CLCs in 1890,
particularly Bank of North America and Mechanics & Traders’ National Bank (Moen and
Tallman 2013).
As part of the 1890 CLC program, the NYCH introduced solvency tests in the form of special
examinations of vulnerable banks. The NYCH, however, did not introduce these
examinations until prompted by the failure of North River Bank, a CLC borrower, on
November 12 (NYT 1890a). In the subsequent days, the NYCH inspected three members
including North River Bank, which was the only of the three banks to be denied additional
CLC support and remained closed (Gorton and Tallman 2016).
7. Funding Source: Member banks received CLCs to use as temporary substitutes for
currency settlements with another NYCH member; CLCs were joint liabilities
collectively shared by the membership.
NYCH member banks used CLCs only in temporary settlements with other member banks as
mutually accepted currency substitutes (Moen and Tallman 2013). Although in 1890 the
NYCH did not impose borrowing limits, individual members’ collateral assets dictated the
amount of CLCs each could borrow. While borrowing banks’ deposited collateral secured
each CLC, the entire membership ultimately shared the liability (Bluedorn and Anderson
2016). In this way, the repayment of each CLC was mutually guaranteed by members’
cumulative cash assets (Moen and Tallman 2013). In the event of a defaulted CLC, the
liquidation of the borrower’s collateral might have been insufficient to repay the cash
liability. As a result, members collectively repaid the liability with their currency reserves,
with each paying in proportion to their share of capital and surplus reserves (Gorton and
Tallman 2016; Hoag 2016).
8. Program Size: The NYCH did not provide a limit to CLC issuance when introducing
the program in 1890, and CLCs outstanding peaked at $15.21 million.
Over the course of the Panic of 1890, the NYCH issued CLCs from November 12 to December
22, 1890, which totaled $16.65 million. The outstanding CLCs reached a peak of $15.21
million on December 12, 1890 (Cannon 1910a). Out of all the panics during the National
Banking Era, the NYCH issued the smallest volume of CLCs in 1890 (OCC 1907). Figure 3
shows the cumulative reserve surplus of all NYCH member banks and outstanding CLCs
between August 1890 and January 1891; while the Treasury intervened heavily in August
and September when the surplus reserves first turned negative, the NYCH introduced CLCs
in November as banking disturbances reemerged (Gorton and Tallman 2018, 47).
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Figure 3: NYCH Reserve Surplus vs. Outstanding CLCs, 1890–1891

Source: Gorton and Tallman 2018, 47.

9. Individual Participation Limits: Evidenced by the large volumes of CLCs issued to
select member banks, certificates did not appear to stipulate limits aside from
collateral availability.
Research did not reveal any individual participation limits. If the NYCH imposed
participation limits in the 1890 CLC program, they likely bore no relation to legal reserves.
Moen and Tallman draw particular attention to the large sums of CLCs the largest
participants borrowed relative to their reserve currency. Of the five largest recipients of
CLCs, only two banks borrowed less than their legal reserves, and their loans still made up
92% and 76% of reserves, respectively (Moen and Tallman 2013). In contrast to both the
Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1890, most of the largest borrowers in other crises took out
CLCs in much smaller amounts relative to their individual cash reserves (Moen and Tallman
2013).
10. Rate Charged: The NYCH stipulated that all CLCs carry a 6% fixed annual rate in
addition to a commission of 0.25% for each month certificates remained unpaid.
CLCs carried an interest rate of 6% paid by the borrowing bank to the member that accepted
the certificates as temporary substitutes for currency in settlement of their mutual balance.
In setting the interest rate, the NYCH stipulated a high enough interest rate to ensure the
quick retirement of CLCs once banks possessed sufficient reserves (Cannon 1910a; OCC
1907). Additionally, CLC rates approximated similar rates for commercial paper (Gorton and
Tallman 2016).
The CLCs issued in 1890 also included an additional 0.25% monthly fee paid to the NYCH for
unredeemed certificates (OCC 1891). This type of fee had been used for some but not all CLC
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programs during National Banking Era panics. Research could not determine what
motivated the NYCH to introduce such fees in some crises.
11. Eligible Collateral: Member banks secured CLCs using bills receivable, stocks,
bonds, and other securities subject to a minimum haircut of 25%, later accepting
government bonds at par.
The resolution introducing CLC issuance in 1890 described eligible collateral for securing
such loans as simply “bills receivable” (OCC 1891). The 1907 annual report of the OCC stated
that in 1884, 1890, and 1893, eligible collateral more broadly consisted of “bills receivable,
stocks, bonds, and other securities” (OCC 1907). Regardless, the 1890 resolution, as in other
crises, demanded that CLCs “not be in excess of 75 per cent of the market value” of the
deposited collateral (OCC 1891); in other words, total collateral offered per CLC was subject
to a minimum 25% haircut, and additional haircuts were up to the discretion of the Loan
Committee (OCC 1891).
12. Loan Duration: The CLCs did not have a specific maturity and were retired at the
initiative of borrowing banks; all CLCs were retired by February 7, 1891.
CLCs did not stipulate a maturity; rather, individual borrowing banks initiated the
cancellation of CLCs by petitioning the Loan Committee (Cannon 1910a). The Loan
Committee, however, selected the final issuing date for CLCs, which was December 22, 1890
(Gorton and Tallman 2016; OCC 1891). The outstanding issues were eventually retired by
February 7, 1891 (OCC 1907).
13. Other Conditions: Research could not determine any other conditions attached to
CLC issuance.
Aside from the resolution for retiring insufficiently secured CLCs—described in Key Design
Decision No. 5, Administration, no further conditions were found.
14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The NYCH, as a private clearinghouse,
received no public mandate for monetary policy and, therefore, did not consider
monetary effects of CLC issuance.
Although CLCs did not directly create money, they reduced the need to hoard currency,
thereby freeing up reserves because NYCH banks—vulnerable to runs—received immediate
resources to settle payments rather than risk insolvency (Gorton and Tallman 2016). The
NYCH attempted to fill the vacant role of a central bank, but the association was bound not
by a public mandate for managing the monetary system but by members’ clearing needs and
legal constraints (Cannon 1910a; Wicker 2000, 128). As a result, the NYCH did not need to
sterilize its temporary CLC issues or consider other monetary implications so long as
regulators did not litigate its actions and members had ample reserves.
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15. Other Options: The NYCH avoided unilateral convertibility suspensions and
reserve pooling, which had been used in other panics.
In several panics during the National Banking Era, banks facing runs stopped converting
demand deposits into currency, thus breaking their contracts with depositors to always
honor withdrawals as long as their doors were open (Gorton and Tallman 2018, 181). In
1873, banks that suspended convertibility issued certified checks backed by the NYCH to
depositors in place of cash. The NYCH’s actions in the panics of 1890 and 1884 were unique
from its initiatives during the other crises in the National Banking Era insofar as they avoided
widespread convertibility suspension across the membership. Suspending convertibility,
while illegal, allowed banks to refuse payments for demand deposits, thereby preventing
deposit runs from becoming bank failures. In both 1890 and 1884, the provision of CLCs
coincided with the onset of the crisis; Gorton and Tallman say that such timely liquidity
assistance “alleviated the need for a suspension of convertibility” (Gorton and Tallman
2016).
16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: The NYCH’s CLC issuances concurred with
other loan certificates issued by the memberships of the Boston and Philadelphia
clearinghouses.
In addition to the NYCH, clearinghouses in two other central reserve cities, Philadelphia and
Boston, issued unique CLCs with which associated members settled intra-clearinghouse
balances (OCC 1907). Compared to the NYCH’s maximum of $15.21 million, CLCs outstanding
peaked at $8.87 and $5.07 million for the Philadelphia and Boston clearinghouses,
respectively (Cannon 1910a). Both the Philadelphia and Boston clearinghouses began
issuing CLCs a week after the NYCH, on November 19, 1890, and although Boston’s
operations ended within a month, the Philadelphia clearinghouse’s CLC issuances lasted
through May 1891 (Cannon 1910a).
17. Communication: The NYCH announced the CLC program and other developments
in their crisis response through regular press channels.
The NYCH approved the resolution to issue CLCs in an emergency meeting on November 11,
1890, the day before the first issues took place (OCC 1907). The NYCH did not notify the
public of the emergency meeting and waited until after markets closed on November 11 to
relay the results of the meeting to the press, in particular, the New York Times (NYT 1890a).
In an article on November 12, the New York Times describes the NYCH’s authorization of
CLCs by stating that the association “had determined to provide against every possible
misfortune and exigency” supported by the membership’s “available assets of $95 million”
(NYT 1890a). Quoted in the New York Times, the president of the NYCH characterizes the
measures as providing “relief for the present and an assurance for the future” (NYT 1890a).
The same New York Times article also quotes an unnamed member of the NYCH’s Clearing
House Committee, who proclaimed, “[T]his ends the money market trouble; loan rates will
be normal now. The pinch is over” (NYT 1890a). J.P. Morgan also weighed in on the CLC plan,
saying that such actions relieved any apprehensions he had about the prospects of the
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financial system as a result of the “considerable amount of cash” released by CLC issues (NYT
1890a).
18. Disclosure: As in other panics, the NYCH suspended publication of balance sheet
information about individual banks, but unlike in other panics, it publicized the
identities of CLC borrowers in 1890.
The suppression of bank statements was among the tools frequently used by the NYCH to
mitigate the effects of bank panics throughout the National Banking Era (Gorton and Tallman
2016). In normal circumstances, NYCH disclosed key financial statistics of individual
member banks in weekly reports often released in the press (Gorton and Tallman 2018, 38).
To protect especially vulnerable banks from speculative deposit runs, the NYCH membership
unliterally suppressed reports during panics. In the Panic of 1890, the NYCH ceased
publishing these detailed financial statements for an extended period beginning on
November 15, 1890, and ending on March 7, 1891, months after the Loan Committee stopped
CLC issuance (Gorton and Tallman 2016).
Similarly, during panics, the NYCH often anonymized CLC usage, reporting borrowings in
aggregate to hide the identity of recipients (Gorton and Tallman 2018, 38). In contrast to
actions in other crises, during the panic of 1890, the NYCH disclosed lending data and
borrower identities to the press. Following the decision to issue CLCs, the NYCH disclosed
the identities of the three borrowers participating in the first round of CLCs. In the New York
Times article discussing the roll out of CLCs, the NYCH stated the following:
Besides Bank of North America, the North River Bank and the Mechanics & Traders’
National Bank were at the beginning of the day unable to effect their exchanges, and had
to be assisted in a small way by the associated banks. (NYT 1890a)
In addition to the borrowers’ identities, the NYCH, in the same article, also disclosed the
financial statics of the borrowers presented in Figure 4 (NYT 1890a):
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Figure 4: The First Day of CLC Issuance, as Disclosed in the New York Times, November
12, 1890

Source: NYT 1890a.

The same article on November 12, 1890, also reported the aggregate volume of CLCs issued
to the three banks, totaling $2 million (NYT 1890a). The day after the first round of CLC
issues, representatives of the NYCH further revealed the amounts each of these three banks
borrowed (NYT 1890b). These disclosures coincided with the failure of one of the borrowers,
North River Bank (NYT 1890b).
Disclosures of sensitive information of borrowing banks appeared to undermine a mutual
commitment through which all NYCH members were “honor bound not to mention the name
of any banks” (NYT 1890c). Nevertheless, Gorton and Tallman (2016) offer the following
explanation as to why the NYCH uniquely disclosed otherwise protected details of CLC
borrowings during 1980: “without notable aggregate risk, the clearing house actions could
deviate from standard routine.”
19. Stigma Strategy: Due to the publication of borrowers’ identities, the 1890 CLCs
may have suffered disproportionately from stigma compared to CLCs issuance
during other crises.
Stigma concerns surrounding CLC issuance appeared to be present, most notably in the
initial rollout of certificates on November 12, 1890. Notably, the NYCH revealed identities of
CLC borrowers during 1890, in contrast with the anonymized disclosures during other
crises. Of the three troubled banks to receive CLCs that day, North River Bank and Mechanics
& Traders’ National Bank received $95,000 and $500,000 in certificates, respectively (NYT
1890b). While Mechanics & Traders’ National Bank received $500,000 in CLCs as “a
precautionary measure,” North River Bank seemingly could have requested more CLCs but
opted for a small allotment; considering that bank examiners closed North River Bank later

1316

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

in the day on November 12, it appeared odd for the bank to have requested such a small
issuance package (NYT 1890b). As referenced in the Key Design Decision No. 18, Disclosure,
the NYCH initially disclosed the aggregate CLC amount borrowed by the three banks on the
first day of issues (NYT 1890a); the NYCH reported the individual borrowings only after the
failure of North River Bank, the day after the bank received CLCs (NYT 1890b).
Sprague (1910, 143) additionally highlights the evidence of stigma in 1890, stating that there
“seem[ed] to have been some hesitation among the banks to take out certificates from the
fear that such action would have been regarded as a confession of weakness.” One large bank,
the Bank of Commerce, attempted to diminish this stigma perception by presenting a
resolution on November 17, 1890, that commended the issuance of CLCs and encouraged
banks in need to use such support measures (Sprague 1910, 143).
20. Exit Strategy: The NYCH did not set an exit strategy or date during the initial
rollout of CLCs; however, the last certificates were issued on December 22, 1890.
In the November 11, 1890, announcement to authorize CLCs, the NYCH did not lay out a final
issue date (NYT 1890a). Research could not determine if the NYCH provided any warning in
advance of the final issuance by the Loan Committee on December 22, 1890 (Cannon 1910a).
Additionally, it appears that the end of the CLC program on December 22 also coincided with
a normalization of call loan rates, which had peaked at 186% and decreased to 6% days
before the final CLC issues, as shown in Figure 5 (Sprague 1910, 145).
Figure 5: New York Bank Statements and Call Loan Rates, November 1–December 18,
1890

Source: Sprague 1910, 145.
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